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MEMORANDUM FOR: ADDP/A

SUBJECT: U. S. Intelligence 1965-1970

1. Our overall feeling is that Mr. Tidwell's paper, while well directed to most points of importance, is too general and overly optimistic. For example, we doubt there will be any real improvement in obtaining critical intelligence on Chinese or Soviet intentions, although perhaps we may make more headway in the European Satellites. Generally too, we are not optimistic as to our ability to process and analyze raw intelligence in step with the increased flow that can be anticipated due to better collection mechanisms and improved techniques. This shortcoming would equally handicap our ability to apply intelligence to policy formation as well as the execution of policy. These observations justify the view that ways and means to narrow down requirements and pinpoint intelligence collection must be heavily emphasized if intelligence is to be applied more effectively in making policy during the years 1965-1970.

2. Another general point is that subject paper deals exclusively with projection of intelligence capabilities which enable a nation to make its policy decisions on an accurate knowledge and analysis of problems affecting its security. These rather restricted terms of reference should be enlarged to cover a forecast of intelligence capabilities essential to implementing many policies which call for both overt and covert actions.

3. Chapter IV, dealing with requirements for collection, does not take into account a projection of capabilities. Clandestine collection in the period 1965-1970 will vary with the capabilities established throughout the decade. Since capabilities are functions of many factors, including the number and competence of American and indigenous agents, the quality of techniques and of collections devices, the conditions favoring or disfavoring agent operations, etc., their assessment projected over an extended period is subject to serious qualifications.

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[redacted] the effectiveness of our intelligence efforts will tend to depend upon our success in sustaining or creating friendly cooperative attitudes, which in turn will be determined by both covert and overt efforts generated in accord with U. S. policies and the priorities assigned to action programs. Our success in gaining information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc will also depend [redacted]

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[redacted] more particularly on the development of international pressures on Soviet leaders to extend the interchange of persons and ideas. In both instances, barring unanticipated setbacks, it would appear that conditions more favorable to clandestine intelligence collection will exist.

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4. It is noted that subject paper does not address itself at all to the question of priorities. An assessment of the mechanism which provides for the establishment of intelligence collection priorities will be an important factor in deciding our overall intelligence capability.

5. The chapter on intelligence analysis provides a clear picture of the importance of knowledge of national character to intelligence estimates. The application of this knowledge to exploit behavioral patterns is not mentioned, although it is obviously of great consequence to covert actions. Again the paper should cover both the interpretive and applied aspects, since the information needed to exploit the habits and ways of thinking of individuals is considerably broader in scope.

6. Chapter VII on specific problems relating to clandestine action programs might contain some of the following ideas: Not only must intelligence be used in formulating policies, but to support their implementation by providing insights to ways and means of covertly influencing the attitudes and acts of foreign nationals in accord with stated objectives. Information is developing steadily on effective mechanisms to reach decision makers directly, or indirectly by such means as manipulation of pressure groups, economic opportunities and public opinion. Between 1965 and 1970 intelligence in this area should have resulted in a comprehensive analysis enabling the selection and penetration of high yield media, greater exploitation of key financial and commercial organizations as well as defining elements holding or rising to political power and means of subjecting them to personal persuasion.

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[redacted] At the same time we shall have advanced significantly the knowledge we are beginning to acquire on individual and group behavior based on the study and analysis of national and international cultural dynamics. The use of this knowledge for interpretive purposes is important in predicting national behavior, but it is of greater importance

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for covertly exploiting behavioral characteristics to achieve both short- and long-range policy goals.

7. Other suggestions for use in Chapter VII may be drawn from Attachment A entitled, "Background Information."

8. Attachment B is a memorandum by  which he prepared after a quick review of Mr. Tidwell's paper.

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Chief
Covert Action Staff

Attachments:
As stated

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SECRET**Attachment A****Background Information**

The current detente, representing a tactical shift in Soviet policies, which may be projected through and perhaps beyond 1965, offers opportunities for the U.S. to get directly at priority targets in previously denied areas and assume larger responsibilities to meet the Soviet peace offensive in the Free World. The burden in both cases will fall on the Clandestine Services, since it appears likely that the overt posture of the U.S. Government will continue to be one of promoting more friendly political relations with the Soviets and European Satellites through normal diplomatic channels.

In addition to countering the thrust and impact of Sino-Soviet efforts, the Clandestine Services, in conjunction with other agencies of the Government, will need to foster, on an increased scale, programs which will result in uniform standards of values among nations essential to stable societies and the peaceful negotiation of international issues.

Long range programs are now underway to develop individuals, groups and parties that can materially assist in attaining U.S. objectives during the period 1965-1970.

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We shall continue to have difficulties in matching Soviet capabilities, using front organizations, but we are beginning to make progress through the exploitation of business opportunities in the private sector, which may significantly offset Soviet advantages by 1970. Greater emphasis on positive action to orient or maintain economic policies and practices in these countries in line with U.S. interests will both further U.S. objectives and counter or negate the program of economic penetration of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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In the propaganda field emphasis is being shifted towards editorial, analytical and scholarly material of more lasting value as opposed to spot

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news. This is being accompanied by the development of continuous propaganda campaigns primarily on permanent themes such as countering the Communist peace offensive, exploiting Sino-Soviet tensions and nationalist and neutralist tendencies.

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The nature of the military threat to national security will require, throughout the period of 1965-1970, the maintenance, at a high level of efficiency, of a Clandestine Services PM capability ready for rapid action in various areas of the world. Communist Bloc and ultra-nationalistic groups will continue their use of revolts, insurgence, coups d'etat, and other forms of indirect aggression in those areas where economic and political instability and other factors contribute to weak administrations. To meet contingencies that may be anticipated, the CS is developing stock-piles and maintaining in a state of readiness weapons and equipment required by armed conflict. The CS also, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, is earmarking and holding in readiness in various theaters, additional items of military equipment and supplies, including heavier weapons, planes and ships for use in emergency situations.

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In the period 1965-1970 the Clandestine Services should have increased capabilities to integrate various forms of covert actions in support of U.S. policy objectives. For example, propaganda and economic assets are now being acquired which may be used to support political action requirements. It is difficult, however, to assess, short of an accurate projection of national policy and the probable situation, the overall impact of the covert action program in the period 1965-1970. Generally it is believed our capabilities will have increased to provide effective action in many countries.

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